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Abstract
The accords were signed by Israel, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Bahrain. This marks the first Persian 
Gulf state and the third/fourth Arab state to normalize 
Israeli relations. These agreements proclaim that 
each state recognizes the sovereignty of the other, 
promotes peace, coexistence, and encourages 
These accords open a door to further Israeli 
recognition by other Arab states. What conditions 
allowed for these accords? Mutual 
concerns/interests concerning Iran’s increasing 
influence in the region was the key reason for the 
mediation’s success. Ripe moment theory needs to 
be implemented in analyzing the conditions that led 
to the successful mediation. The independent need 
to be analyzed and argues that the underlying 
conditions (economic and security related) of the 
parties created the ripe moment for the accords. 
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Conclusion
1. This hurting stalemate was the states of Bahrain and the 
UAE coming to the realization that their economic and 
military need to cooperate openly with Israel supersedes 
their desire to stay in the boycott.
2. Iran has become too much of a threat for them to overlook, 
their looming catastrophe
3. Objective elements that contributed to this stalemate was 
the tentative partnership that Israel and Saudi Arabia has 
established that allowed the GCC to start cooperation
4. The informal mediation had been taking place for years; 
these accords to were more of an evolution than a 
revolution.
Additional Factors to Consider 
1. Oslo Accords in 1992
2. The Failure of the Iranian Nuclear Deal 
3. The peace treaties between Israel and the individual states of 
Egypt and Jordan 
Ripe Moment Theory
1. Coined by William Zartman in 1985 
2. When dealing with conflict between parties, 
specifically long-term conflicts, there is a specific 
time that negotiations are possible
1. Hurting Stalemate 
2. Looming catastrophe 
Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain have 
met these conditions
This ripeness is not enough for full scale negotiations
Conditions must be taken advantage either by these 
states themselves or through a mediator, a role the 
United States acted as. 
Contributing Factors
Relationship between Saudi Arabia 
and Israel/ Security Incentive:
1. Ties that have formed over the years 
between Saudi Arabia and Israel 
because of the increasing threat Iran 
is becoming in the region
2. Iranian revolution encouraged Shi’i 
protests and revolts in Saudi Arabi, 
Bahrain, and Kuwait. 
3. Iran has sponsors terrorist 
organizations such as Hezbollah.
4. Arab Spring created Cold War 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
5. They have a common regional 
adversary, both states began to see 
one another in a less antagonistic 
light and form a light partnership 
6. Bahrain depends on Saudi Arabia for 
security 
Economic Incentive 
1. Will allow for previously private 
economic dealings to be carried out 
publicly, and therefore expanded in all 
areas
2. Eager to gain access to Israel 
espionage technology and military 
advancements
3. Desire for economic growth within the 
countries was brought to the forefront 
due to the Covid caused economic 
crisis
4. There is no distinction between 
business and politics 
Mediation 
1. Bahrain and the UAE had already 
established that they desired an end 
to the conflict or a “way out” policy
1. Informal mediations had 
been taking place between 
these three states for years 
2. Could not talk to Israel publicly 
without being suspected of leaving 
boycott
1. Israel was making no 
progress regarding 
Palestinian relations 
2. Track II diplomacy was the 
only option 
3. The United States was asked to be 
the official mediator 
1. Both states had mutual trust 
for the U.S.
Figure 2. Security Impacts of the Accords
Shows the differing regional shifts and Arab 
priority. The Palestinians see this as a betrayal to 
their interests and the Iranians see this as a further 
security threat.  
Figure 4.
Table displays the increased approval for Israeli 
cooperation that has risen significantly from 
2015. It is this increased public approval rating 
that has allowed for the Accords. 
Figure 3.
Displays the total number of money made from 
exports within the UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, 
and Israel. Shows the economic benefits of an 
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Figure 1. Title:  Signing of the Accords
Representatives of the United States, Israel, 
Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates sign the 
Abraham Accords 
